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Current Circuit Splits 
The following pages contain brief summaries of circuit splits 
identified by federal court of appeals opinions announced between 
January 31, 2016 and July 31, 2016.  This collection, written by the 
members of the Seton Hall Circuit Review, is organized into civil and 
criminal matters, and then by subject matter and court. 
Each summary briefly describes a current circuit split, and it 
intended to give only the briefest synopsis of the circuit split, and not a 
comprehensive analysis.  This compilation makes no claim to be 
exhaustive, but aims to serve the reader well as a referential starting 
point. 
Preferred citation for the summaries below: Circuit Splits, 13 
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CIVIL 
BANKING LAW 
Consumer Protection – Fair Debt Collection Act: Janetos v. Fulton 
Friedman & Gullace, LLP, 825 F.3d 317 (7th Cir. 2016) 
The 7th Circuit addressed whether a debt collector is liable for an 
agent’s failure to disclose “the name of the creditor to whom [a] debt 
is owed” to the consumer.  Id. at 319.  The court noted that the 3rd and 
9th Circuits determined that a debt collector could not escape vicarious 
liability for violations of the Act committed by agents, while the 6th 
Circuit found that the owner of debt is not vicariously liable when it is 
not a debt collector itself.  Id. at 325–26.  The 7th Circuit agreed with 
the 3rd and 9th Circuits in finding that an entity itself is a debt collector 
and should bear the burden of agents it enlists to collect debts on its 
behalf.  Id.  The court disagreed with 6th Circuit as to whether 
[defendant] was a debt-collector under this scope of review.  Id.  Thus, 
the 7th Circuit concluded “a debt collector who is independently 
obliged to comply with [statutory restrictions] must monitor the actions 
of those it enlists to collect debts in its behalf” to avoid vicarious 
liability.  Id. at 325. 
 
First Amendment – Anti-Surcharge Law: Rowell v. Pettijohn, 816 
F.3d 73 (5th Cir. 2016) 
The 5th Circuit addressed “whether the [Texas Anti-Surcharge 
Law, Tex. Fin. Code Ann. § 339.00, proscription against] surcharges 
for credit-card purchases constitutes a First Amendment violation.”  Id. 
at 75.  In 1984, the federal ban on surcharges expired and states began 
enacting anti-surcharge regulation.  Id. at 77.  The court noted that the 
2nd Circuit determined that the New York anti-surcharge law regulated 
economic activity and did not implicate First Amendment protections, 
while the 11th Circuit determined that Florida’s anti-surcharge law 
regulated the content of merchant speech, thereby implicating First 
Amendment protections.  Id. at 78–79.  The 5th Circuit also noted that 
that the Texas anti-surcharge law, like New York’s anti-surcharge law, 
does not define the terms “surcharge” or “discounts” or “any other 
pricing schemes beyond imposing surcharges for credit-card 
transactions.”  Id. at 80.  The 5th Circuit joined the 2nd Circuit in 
holding that Texas’s anti-surcharge law regulates economic behavior 
and does not implicate merchant First Amendment rights.  Id. at 81. 
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Statutory Interpretation – Federal Debt Collection Procedures 
Act (FDCPA): United States v. Badger, 818 F.3d 563 (10th Cir. 
2016) 
The 10th Circuit addressed the issue of whether “debt” as defined 
in the Federal Debt Collection Procedures Act (FDCPA) includes 
“disgorgement” for purposes of enforcing a disgorgement order against 
the defendant.  Id. at 573.  The court noted that the 5th Circuit has held 
that the “FDCPA’s definition of debt does not explicitly include 
disgorgement,” and “disgorgement was not restitution because [i]t is an 
equitable remedy meant to prevent the wrongdoer from enriching 
himself by his wrongs . . . .”  Id. at 574 (alterations in original) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  Whereas, the 7th Circuit has held that the 
FDCPA does not apply in “a proceeding to remedy a contempt of 
court.”  Id. at 576 n.5.  The court joined the 5th Circuit, in holding that 
the disgorgement order is not subject to the FDCPA.  Id. at 576.  But, 
the 10th Circuit noted that it is “not as confident as the [5th Circuit] 
that disgorgement does not come within the meaning of restitution in 
the FDCPA.”  Id. at 576 n.5 (alteration in original).  The court reasoned 
that the Restatement (Third) of Restitution often refers to disgorgement 
as a type of restitution.  Id.  However, the FDCPA contains an 
exception, which states that it cannot be interpreted to supersede or 
modify any federal law that authorizes, or any inherent authority of a 
federal court to provide, injunctive relief.  Id.  Such injunctive relief 
includes disgorgement injunctions or contempt sanctions.  Id. 
BANKRUPTCY 
Jurisdiction – Claims Arising Under the Medicare Act: Fla. 
Agency for Health Care Admin. v. Bayou Shores SNF, LLC (In re 
Bayou Shores SNF, LLC), 828 F.3d 1297 (11th Cir. 2016) 
The 11th Circuit addressed whether “42 U.S.C. § 405(h) bar[s] a 
bankruptcy court from exercising 28 U.S.C. § 1334 [bankruptcy] 
jurisdiction over claims that arise under the Medicare Act.”  Id. at 1304.  
The court recognized that circuits are split over the application of the 
jurisdictional bar of § 405(h), in light of a series of statutory revisions 
and codifications.  Id. at 1310.  The court noted that the 3rd, 7th and 
8th Circuits examined the application of § 405(h) in the context of 
diversity claims brought under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, and found that 
§ 405(h) does serve as a bar to the exercise of jurisdiction over claims 
arising under the Medicare Act.  Id.  The court further noted that while 
the 9th Circuit held § 405(h) bars § 1332 jurisdiction, “[it] is alone 
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among circuit court decisions in reading § 405(h) to permit bankruptcy 
court jurisdiction over Medicare claims under § 1334.”  Id. at 1312.  
The 11th Circuit joined with the 3rd, 7th and 8th Circuits in finding that 
the subsequent revisions to § 405(h) were not intended to produce any 
substantive change to the scope of the statute, and therefore, as § 1334 
jurisdiction over Medicare claims were barred prior to the revision, that 
jurisdictional bar carried forward after the revisions.  Id. at 1314.  The 
court disagreed with the 9th Circuit’s interpretation of § 405(h) as 
providing a “broad jurisdictional grant” to bankruptcy courts under 
§ 1334, to hear Medicare claims that in some way pertain to a 
bankruptcy matter.  Id. at 1311 (internal citations omitted).  Thus, the 
11th Circuit sided with the 3rd, 7th and 8th Circuits, holding “that 
because the previous version of § 405(h) precluded bankruptcy court 
review of Medicare claims under § 1334, so too must the newly revised 
§ 405(h) bar such actions.”  Id. at 1322. 
The Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act – Trust Assets: 
Kingdom Fresh Produce, Inc. v. Stokes Law Office, L.L.P. (In re 
Delta Produce, L.P.), 817 F.3d 141 (5th Cir. 2016) 
The 5th Circuit addressed whether Perishable Agricultural 
Commodities Act (PACA) trustee fees can “be deducted from the 
PACA trust assets before all claimants are made whole.”  Id. at 151.  
The court noted that the 2nd Circuit held that a “PACA trustee may not 
use PACA funds to pay attorney’s fees incurred in collecting accounts 
receivable,” while the 9th Circuit held that PACA trustees should be 
compensated for collection costs.  Id. at 152.  The court reasoned that 
“[t]he superpriority status of PACA claimants is preserved and the 
attorney claimants bear the greater risk of nonpayment. That difference 
is the very one Congress sought to achieve with the trust amendments 
to PACA.”  Id. at 154.  As such, the 5th Circuit agreed with the 2nd 
Circuit in finding that “PACA’s unequivocal language requires that a 
PACA trustee may not be paid from trust assets until full payment of 
the sums owing is paid to all claimants.”  Id. at 153–54. 
CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Diversity Jurisdiction – Amount in Controversy: Pershing, L.L.C. 
v. Kiebach, 819 F.3d 179 (5th Cir. 2016) 
The 5th Circuit addressed “whether the amount in controversy for 
establishing diversity jurisdiction over a petition to confirm an 
arbitration award is the amount awarded by the arbitration panel or the 
amount previously sought in the arbitration proceeding.”  Id. at 182.  
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The court noted that the 1st, 9th, and D.C. Circuits determined the 
amount in controversy to be the same as the amount demanded in the 
underlying arbitration proceeding, while the 6th and 11th Circuits 
determined the amount in controversy to be the same as the amount 
awarded by the arbitration panel.  Id.  The 5th Circuit agreed with the 
1st, 9th, and D.C. Circuits that the amount in controversy is the amount 
demanded in the previous arbitration proceeding.  Id. at 183.  The court 
reasoned that the “demand approach” better recognized the scope of 
the controversy, since an arbitration award only represents a part of the 
litigation while the amount initially sought still frames the litigation 
overall.  Id.  The court was also persuaded by the fact that the “demand 
approach” more closely tracks the litigation of diversity jurisdiction 
claims, where the pleadings—and not the outcome—determine if the 
amount in controversy requirements have been met for diversity 
jurisdiction.  Id. at 182–183.  The court disagreed with the 6th and 11th 
Circuits use of the “award approach” because it was concerned that a 
court could have diversity jurisdiction over the claim at one stage of 
the case (e.g. a motion to compel arbitration if the amount demanded 
were high enough), but lack jurisdiction over the same claim at a later 
stage (e.g. a petition to confirm arbitration where the amount awarded 
fell below diversity jurisdiction minimums).  Id. at 182.  Thus, the 5th 
Circuit concluded that the “demand approach” would determine the 
amount in controversy for arbitration petitions brought through 
diversity jurisdiction.  Id. at 183. 
False Claims Act – Heightened Pleading Requirements: United 
States ex rel. Eberhard v. Physicians Choice Lab. Servs., LLC, 642 F. 
App’x 547 (6th Cir. 2016) 
The 6th Circuit addressed whether violations of the False Claims 
Act (FCA) are subject to the heightened pleading standard of Rule 9(b).  
Id. at 550.  The court noted that the 4th, 8th, and 11th Circuits require 
“representative samples” of the alleged fraudulent conduct.  Id. at 550.  
The 1st, 3rd, 5th, and 9th Circuits held “that it is sufficient for a plaintiff 
to allege particular details of a scheme to submit false claims paired 
with reliable indicia that lead to a strong inference that claims were 
actually submitted.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  The court 
stated that the 6th Circuit previously “impose[d] a strict requirement 
that relators identify actual false claims.”  Id.  (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  The 6th Circuit agreed with the 4th, 8th, and 11th Circuits in 
holding that there needs to be a “sufficiently strong inference” for 
alleging FCA violations.  Id. at 553. 
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Habeas Corpus – Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act: 
Rishor v. Ferguson, 822 F.3d 482 (9th Cir. 2016) 
The 9th Circuit considered whether a petitioner’s Rule 59(e) 
motion should be construed as a “second or successive habeas 
petition,” which are subject to the restrictions of the Antiterrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA).  Id. at 490.  The court 
noted that the 4th, 5th, 8th and 10th Circuits determinations were based 
on the Supreme Court’s ruling in Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524 
(2005).  Id. at 491 There, the Court held that where a Rule 59(e) motion 
advances a “claim,” the motion should be construed as a second or 
successive habeas petition.  Id.  Conversely, the 3rd, 6th and 7th 
Circuits have held that irrespective of whether a Rule 59(e) motion 
advances a “claim” within the meaning of Gonzalez, the motion 
“should never be construed as a second or successive habeas petition.”  
Id.  The 9th Circuit declined to adopt the approach of the 4th, 5th, 8th 
and 10th Circuits as it found that such an approach would allow the 
AEDPA to “preclude broadly reconsideration of just-entered 
judgments,” without any indication that Congress intended for the 
statute to do so.  Id. at 492.  The court also declined to adhere to the 
“bright-line” approach taken by the 3rd, 6th and 7th Circuits in 
excluding Rule 59(e) motions from the scope of the AEDPA and 
Gonzalez entirely, as doing so would “allow district courts to 
improperly entertain . . . motions that are ‘in substance’ habeas 
petitions.’”  Id. at 493.  Rather, the court opted for a “hybrid” approach 
that would apply the second-or-successive bar to a Rule 59(e) motion 
“only when the motion raises entirely new claims.”  Id.  Thus, the 9th 
Circuit held that a Rule 59(e) motion for reconsideration that “seeks to 
raise an argument or ground for relief that was not raised in the initial 
habeas petition,” which in effect raises an entirely new claim, will be 
“construed as a second or successive habeas petition subject to the 
AEDPA’s restrictions.”  Id. at 492. 
Motions to Intervene – Standing Requirements: Laroe Estates, Inc. 
v. Town of Chester, 828 F.3d 60 (2d Cir. 2016) 
 The 2nd Circuit analyzed whether an intervenor, under Rule 24 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, is required to independently 
meet the United States Constitution Article III standing requirements 
to intervene in litigation where the requirement is already satisfied 
between the existing parties.  Id. at 64.  The court noted that despite a 
long-standing circuit split on the issue, the Supreme Court has 
expressly declined to resolve it.  Id. at 65.  The 2nd Circuit held that 
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despite the Supreme Court’s refusal to decide this issue, it has at least 
endorsed its position by sub silentio, permitting parties to intervene in 
cases without determining whether they have standing.  Id.  The 2nd 
Circuit’s position is consistent with the 3rd, 5th, 6th, 9th, 10th and 11th 
Circuits.  Id. at 64–65.  The 7th, 8th, and the D.C. Circuits disagree and 
hold that Article III standing is an additional requirement for 
intervenors.  Id. at 65.  The 2nd Circuit ultimately reasoned that “there 
is no need to impose the standing requirement upon a proposed 
intervenor where the existence of a case or controversy has been 
established in the underlying litigation.”  Id. at 64 (internal citations 
omitted). 
Prison Litigation Reform Act – Frivolous Filings: Daker v. 
Comm’r, Ga. Dep’t of Corr., 820 F.3d 1278 (11th Cir. 2016) 
The 11th Circuit addressed the three-strikes provision of the 
Prison Litigation Reform Act, (the “Act”) which “bars a prisoner who 
is not in danger of physical injury and has had three frivolous, 
malicious, or meritless filings from proceeding in forma pauperis.”  Id. 
at 1283.  The court stated that the statute acknowledges three specific 
grounds that render a dismissal a strike: “frivolous,” “malicious,” and 
“fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.”  Id.  The court 
noted that the D.C. and 10th Circuits held that a judge’s denial of a 
petition to proceed in forma pauperis for frivolousness is the “but for” 
cause of the panel’s dismissal of the appeal for want of prosecution, 
and constitutes a strike under the Act.  Id. at 1285.  The 11th Circuit 
disagreed, holding that the sequence of events that caused the dismissal 
is irrelevant, reasoning that the Act’s language includes no indication 
that “but for” causation is a determining factor and instead focuses on 
grounds actually articulated in the order.  Id. 
CIVIL RIGHTS 
Protection of Disabled Persons – Rehabilitation Act: Flynn v. 
Distinctive Home Care, Inc., 812 F.3d 422 (5th Cir. 2016) 
The 5th Circuit addressed whether “an independent contractor 
who lacks an employer-employee relationship with the defendant [can] 
sue that defendant for employment discrimination under Section 504 
of the Rehabilitation Act . . . .”  Id. at 425.  Section 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act “broadly prohibits discrimination . . . against 
disabled persons in federally assisted programs or activities.”  Id. at 
425–26 (quotation marks omitted) (brackets omitted).  The court noted 
that the 8th Circuit previously held that independent contractors may 
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not bring such suits because the Rehabilitation Act follows Title I’s 
prohibition of employment discrimination suits by independent 
contracts.  Id. at 429.  The court explained that the 9th and 10th Circuits 
held otherwise, allowing for such suits to be brought under the 
Rehabilitation Act.  Id. at 427–28.  The 5th Circuit agreed with the 9th 
and 10th Circuits in holding that because the Rehabilitation Act “does 
not incorporate Title I’s standards for determining which entities may 
be held liable for employment discrimination, it does not incorporate 
Title I’s requirement that the defendant be the plaintiff’s employer.”  
Id. at 429.  Thus, in the 5th Circuit, independent contractors may bring 
employment discrimination suits under the Rehabilitation Act.  Id. at 
432. 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
Second Amendment – Standard of Scrutiny: Kolbe v. Hogan, 813 
F.3d 160 (4th Cir. 2016) 
The 4th Circuit addressed what standard of scrutiny should be 
applied when resolving Second Amendment challenges.  Id. at 179.  
The court noted that the 7th Circuit dispensed of levels of scrutiny 
entirely, while the D.C. and 9th Circuits applied a standard of 
intermediate scrutiny.  Id. at 182–83.  The 4th Circuit disagreed with 
the 7th, D.C., and 9th Circuits because, “the law here ‘goes beyond 
mere regulation’ and is instead ‘a total prohibition of possession of 
certain types of arms.’”  Id. at 183 (internal citations omitted).  Thus, 
the 4th Circuit concluded, “strict scrutiny, then, is the appropriate level 
of scrutiny to apply to the ban of semi-automatic rifles and magazines 
holding more than 10 rounds.”  Id. at 182. 
CONTRACTS 
Government Benefits – Procurement Funds: United States v. 
Harris, 821 F.3d 589 (5th Cir. 2016) 
The 5th Circuit addressed whether procurement funds involved in 
government contracts, awarded through an affirmative action 
contracting program, are properly handled under the special 
government benefits rule for loss calculation or the general loss 
calculation rule.  Id. at 602.  The 5th Circuit noted the 9th Circuit’s 
position that the general rule of loss calculation applies because the text 
of the special rule provides examples of only unilateral benefits, not 
contracts.  Id. at 604.  Conversely, the 4th Circuit decided to apply the 
special governments rule without explanation.  Id.  The court explained 
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that the 7th and 11th Circuits have also applied the special governments 
rule because the government contracts awarded were in pursuit of a 
program that had a primary purpose of assisting small, minority owned 
businesses.  Id.  The 5th Circuit joined the 9th Circuit, as “[t]he mere 
fact that a government contract furthers some public policy objective 
apart from the government’s procurement needs is not enough to 
transform the contract into a government benefit akin to a grant or an 
entitlement program payment.”  Id. (quotation marks omitted).  Thus, 
the 5th Circuit held that “procurement frauds involving contracts 
awarded under [affirmative action contracting programs] should be 
treated under the general rule for loss calculation.”  Id. 
COPYRIGHT 
De Minimis Exception – Sound Recordings: VMG Salsoul, LLC v. 
Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2016) 
  The 9th Circuit analyzed whether the “de minimis” exception 
applies to copyrighted sound recordings.  Id at 874.  The court 
concluded that Congress intended for the “de minimis” exception to 
apply to sound recordings and, therefore, the court disagreed and 
created a circuit split with the 6th Circuit.  Id. at 886.  The court 
reasoned that the 6th Circuit failed to consider the statutory structure, 
especially the express limitation on the rights of a copyright holder, as 
well as the legislative history.  Id. at 884.  The “de minimis” test, in the 
court’s eyes, always applies when a “second artist has taken some 
expressive content from the original artist.”  Id. at 885.  Therefore, the 
court held that the “de minimis” exception applies to actions alleging 
infringement of a copyright to sound recordings.  Id at 887. 
IMMIGRATION 
Removal Proceedings – Requirement of a Notice to Appear: 
Orozco-Velasquez v. Att’y Gen. United States, 817 F.3d 78 (3d Cir. 
2016) 
The 3rd Circuit addressed whether a “notice to appear” (NTA) 
that lacks the specificity required by the Immigration and Nationality 
Act (INA) is effective in executing the removal of an alleged alien.  Id. 
at 79.  An alien must reside in the United States “for a continuous 
period of not less than 10 years” to be eligible for cancellation of 
removal.  Id.  A properly administered NTA triggers the INA’s “stop-
time” rule, which ends an alien’s “period of continuous residence” 
upon receipt.  Id. at n.2.  In addressing the denial of a plaintiff’s 
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application for cancellation of removal, the 3rd Circuit rejected the 4th 
and 7th Circuits’ argument that 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1)’s “stop-time” 
definition was ambiguous as to what the drafter’s intended of the “stop-
time” rule.  Id. at 82.  By granting Chevron deference to the Board of 
Immigration Appeals’s interpretation of the statute, many similar cases 
ended in similar denials of applications for cancellation of removal.  Id.  
The 3rd Circuit found that the drafter’s obvious intent was highlighted 
by the existence of the word “shall,” which presented a “clear-cut 
command set out in § 1229(a)(1) that notice ‘shall be given in person 
to the alien . . . specifying,’ inter alia, ‘[t]he time and place at which 
the proceeding will be held’” in regards to a NTA.  Id. at 83.  The 3rd 
Circuit held that because of the government’s failure to adhere to the 
strict guidelines of the NTA, the plaintiff was entitled to apply for 
cancellation of removal.  Id. at 84. 
SECURITIES 
Securities Exchange Act – Statute of Repose: Stein v. Regions 
Morgan Keegan Select High Income Fund, Inc., 821 F.3d 780 (6th 
Cir. 2016) 
The 6th Circuit addressed whether tolling applies to a statute of 
repose.  Id. at 792.  The court noted that the 10th Circuit determined 
that tolling applies to statutes of repose pending class certification, 
while the 2nd Circuit found tolling could not apply to statutes of repose.  
Id. at 793.  The 6th Circuit agreed with the 2nd Circuit, in finding that 
it was more consistent with the Supreme Court’s holding that “[the 
relevant statute] was an ‘unqualified bar on actions’ after the five-year 
period, ‘giving defendants total repose’ after that time.”  Id. at 793–94.  
The court disagreed with the 10th Circuit that “legal tolling” is 
applicable to statutes of repose.  Id. at 793.  Thus, the 6th Circuit 
concluded that tolling could not apply to statutes of repose.  Id. at 794. 
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CRIMINAL 
CONSTITUTIONAL 
Right to Assistance of Counsel – Right to Counsel of Choice: 
United States v. Jimenez-Antunez, 820 F.3d 1267 (11th Cir. 2016) 
The 11th Circuit addressed whether the standard for evaluating a 
motion to replace retained counsel with appointed counsel ought to be 
an interference with justice standard, or a good cause standard, under 
the Sixth Amendment.  Id. at 1271.  The court noted that the 9th Circuit 
applied an interference of justice standard in evaluating a defendant’s 
motion to replace retained counsel with appointed counsel, while the 
1st Circuit applied a good cause standard.  Id. at 1271–72.  The 11th 
Circuit agreed with the 9th Circuit that, since the right to counsel of 
choice is implicated when a defendant moves to replace retained 
counsel with appointed counsel, an interference with justice standard 
applies.  Id. at 1271.  The court disagreed with 1st Circuit that the 
motion to dismiss retained counsel no longer involved the right to 
counsel of choice because it had merged with an action to engage new 
counsel; the court noted the 1st Circuit offered no other explanation for 
its implementation of a good cause standard.  Id. at 1272.  The 11th 
Circuit concluded that since a defendant who moves to dismiss retained 
counsel retains the right to counsel of choice, the standard for 
evaluating such a motion is interference with justice.  Id. 
Sentencing Guidelines – Residual Clauses: United States v. Pawlak, 
822 F.3d 902 (6th Cir. 2016) 
The 6th Circuit addressed whether “the Supreme Court’s holding 
in Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) that the Armed 
Career Criminal Act’s ‘residual clause’ is unconstitutionally vague, 
compels the same result for an identical ‘residual clause’ in the United 
States Sentencing Guidelines.”  Id. at 903.  The court noted that the 
2nd, 3rd, 7th, 8th and 10thCircuits have held the Guidelines’s residual 
clause to be unconstitutionally vague in light of the ruling in Johnson, 
while the 11th Circuit has been the only circuit to determine that the 
ruling in Johnson leaves the Guidelines unaffected.  Id. at 907–08.  The 
court disagreed with the 11th Circuit’s determination that the 
Guidelines are immune to vagueness challenges because the court’s 
decision relied on case law that has been undermined by recent 
Supreme Court decisions.  Id. at 908–09.  The court similarly rejected 
the 11th Circuit’s characterization that “exposing the Guidelines to 
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vagueness challenges will upend our sentencing regime.”  Id. at 909–
10 (internal quotations omitted).  Thus, in joining with a majority of 
the circuits, the 6th Circuit departed from its own precedent in holding 
that “the rationale of Johnson applies equally to the residual clause of 
the Guidelines,” and therefore, is unconstitutionally vague.  Id. at 911. 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
Motion Objection Requirements – Speedy Trial Act: United States 
v. Brown, 819 F.3d 800 (6th Cir. 2016) 
The 6th Circuit addressed the issue of whether a motion for 
objection to a Speedy Trial Act (“STA”) violation on behalf of the 
defendant must be in writing, or if an oral objection satisfies the 
requirements.  Id. at 822.  The court noted that the 7th, 9th and 10th 
Circuits have held that “a defendant’s oral objection to an alleged STA 
violation satisfies [18 U.S.C.] § 3162(a)(2)’s motion requirement so 
long as the defendant brings to the court’s attention his belief that his 
STA rights have been violated.”  Id. at 823.  Alternatively, the 1st 
Circuit held that “the defendant’s oral motion to dismiss did not satisfy 
the Act’s motion requirement.”  Id. at 824.  The court disagreed with 
the 1st Circuit because “§ 3162(a)(2) does not specify whether th[e] 
[defendant’s] motion must be in writing, and the Spagnuolo court cited 
no binding authority for the proposition that an oral motion can never 
satisfy § 3162(a)(2).”  Id.  The court also noted that “reading the word 
‘written’ into a § 3162(a)(2) motion, where Congress did not draft the 
statute to include this requirement, would ignore the fact that an oral 
objection may bring an alleged STA violation to the district court’s 
attention just as readily as a written motion, and thereby elevate form 
over substance.”  Id.  The 6th Circuit joined the 7th, 9th and 10th 
Circuits in holding that “oral objections at the final pretrial conference 
satisf[y] § 3162(a)(2)[‘s]” statutory requirements.  Id. at 826. 
Sentencing – Sentencing Guidelines: In re Encinias, 821 F.3d 1224 
(10th Cir. 2016) 
The 10th Circuit addressed whether the vagueness doctrine 
enforced by Johnson vs. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) applies 
to the definition of “crime of violence” contained in United States 
Sentencing Guidelines (Sentencing Guidelines).  Id. at 1225–26.  The 
court noted that the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th and 9th Circuits 
determined that Johnson’s vagueness doctrine applies to the 
Sentencing Guidelines because the definition uses the same language 
as the definition of “violent felony” in the Armed Career Criminal Act 
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(ACCA), while the 11th Circuit has not applied Johnson to the 
Sentencing Guidelines.  Id. at 1225.  The 10th Circuit agreed with the 
majority of circuits in finding that because the Supreme Court 
previously held that the ACCA was unconstitutionally vague, the 
Sentencing Guideline ought to be as well.  Id. at 1226.   Thus, the 10th 
Circuit concluded that the vagueness doctrine of Johnson applies to the 
Sentencing Guidelines.  Id. 
Sentencing – Sentencing Guidelines: United States v. Waters, 823 
F.3d 1062 (7th Cir. 2016) 
The 7th Circuit was faced with the question of whether the crime 
of domestic battery, as defined by Illinois state law, qualifies as a 
“crime of violence” within the meaning of the career offender 
sentencing guidelines.  Id. at 1064.  A “crime of violence” classification 
within this context requires that the underlying crime “has as an 
element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force 
against the person of another.”  Id. (internal citations omitted).  It was 
argued that because the underlying criminal statute for domestic battery 
did not include such physical force as an express element of the crime, 
it lacked standing for a “crime of violence” classification.  Id.  
However, the 7th Circuit reaffirmed the position it had taken 
previously, that “a conviction for domestic battery under Illinois law 
necessarily requires proving physical force,” as would any crime 
requiring proof of intentional causation of bodily harm.  Id.  In doing 
so, the 7th Circuit reaffirmed its alignment with the 8th Circuit on this 
issue.  Id. at 1065.   Conversely, the 1st and 4th Circuits have endorsed 
the countervailing argument, that similar statutes to the domestic 
battery statute at question in this case, “requiring intent or a threat to 
cause bodily harm do not include an element of force.”  Id. 
Sentencing – Supervised Release: United States v. Marsh, 829 F.3d 
705 (D.C. Cir. 2016) 
The D.C. Circuit addressed whether 18 U.S.C. § 3624(e) “tolls a 
term of supervised release during a period of pretrial detention where 
the defendant is ultimately convicted of the charges on which he is 
held.”  Id. at 707.  The court noted that the 9th Circuit determined that 
“pretrial detention does not constitute an ‘imprisonment’ within the 
meaning of § 3624(e) and thus does not operate to toll a term of 
supervised release.”  Id. at 709.  Conversely, 4th, 5th, 6th and 11th 
Circuits held that “[imprisonment] makes no temporal distinctions 
between pre-and postconviction periods of confinement.”  Id. at 708.  
The D.C. Circuit agreed with the 9th Circuit, but relied on the phrase 
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“is imprisoned,” as opposed to the phrase “imprisoned in connection 
with a conviction” that the 9th Circuit relied.  Id. at 709.  The court 
disagreed with the 4th, 5th, 6th and 11th Circuits as those circuits failed 
to “give[] effect to each word in the statute.”  Id. at 710.   The D.C. 
Circuit concluded that § 3624(e) should be interpreted in the present 
tense, and thus, pretrial detention does not constitute an imprisonment 
within the meaning of statute.  Id. at 707. 
FIREARM POSSESSION 
Standards of Review – Unregistered Firearm: United States v. 
White, 824 F.3d 783 (8th Cir. 2016) 
The 8th Circuit addressed whether a defendant possessing a quasi-
suspect weapon must also know “of the characteristics [of the weapon] 
which bring it under the coverage of the National Firearm Act[‘s]” 
requirements to warrant conviction.   Id. at 790.  The court noted that 
the 5th, 7th and 9th Circuits determined that “even when a weapon is 
quasi-suspect, the government must prove a defendant’s knowledge of 
the characteristics that bring the weapon within the purview of the 
statute.”  Id.  The court previously held that “[w]here the firearm is 
quasi-suspect . . . a specific jury finding of knowledge of the weapon’s 
incriminating characteristics is unnecessary.”  Id.  The 8th Circuit 
recognized its reservations on the split, but reasoned it “must [continue 
to apply] it as circuit precedent.”  Id. at 791.  The 8th Circuit concluded 
that “the jury need not have found that [defendant] knew of the 
characteristics.”  Id. 
IMMIGRATION 
Appeals – State Law Applied to a State Statute: Almanza-Arenas v. 
Lynch, 815 F.3d 469 (9th Cir. 2016) 
The 9th Circuit addressed whether courts should evaluate the 
divisibility of a state statute by looking “to state law to verify whether 
a state statute has elements or means” in regards to the interpretation of 
the second footnote in Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 
(2013).  Almanza-Arenas, 815 F.3d at 480.  The court noted that the 5th 
and 10th Circuits determined that the second footnote in Descamps 
does not differentiate between elements and means, and that courts 
should not look to state law, but should only look to Taylor and 
Shepard documents.  Id. at 481–82.  The 4th and 8th Circuits found that 
courts should look to state law in order to determine whether a state 
statute has elements or means.  Id.  The 9th Circuit agreed with the 4th 
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and 8th Circuits in finding that courts should look to state law to 
evaluate the divisibility of a state statute.  Id.  The court disagreed with 
the 5th and 10th Circuits as to the interpretation of Descamps.  Id.  The 
court reasoned that Descamps offers a “guide to courts to look at Taylor 
and Shepard documents if there [is] difficulty in distinguishing 
between the elements and means,” but “cannot be read to suggest that 
elements and means are one and the same.”  Id. at 481.  Thus, the 9th 
Circuit held that a court should look to state law when interpreting a 
state statute.  Id. 
Criminal Aliens – Civil Detention: Reid v. Donelan, 819 F.3d 486 
(1st Cir. 2016) 
The 1st Circuit addressed the enforcement method of the statutory 
reasonableness requirement for criminal aliens following their criminal 
sentence and pending their removal proceedings.  Id. at 495.  The court 
noted that the 2nd and 9th Circuits limited detention to six months 
absent a finding of exigent circumstance, while the 3rd and 6th Circuits 
found individualized review necessary to determine the reasonableness 
of continued detention.  Id.  The 1st Circuit agreed with the 3rd and 6th 
Circuits in finding such highly sensitive fact inquiries require a flexible 
and less rigid approach.  Id. at 498.  The court disagreed with the 2nd 
and 9th Circuits’ bright-line rule requiring review after six months.  Id.  
The 1st Circuit joined the 3rd and 6th Circuits in holding the statutory 
reasonableness requirement for criminal aliens depends upon the facts 
at hand and a determination of reasonableness shall occur on a case-
by-case basis.  Id. 
Denaturalization – Procurement of Citizenship or Naturalization 
Unlawfully: United States v. Maslenjak, 821 F.3d 675 (6th Cir. 2016) 
The 6th Circuit addressed whether an implied materiality element 
ought to be read into 18 U.S.C. § 1425(a), which criminalizes the 
knowing procurement of citizenship or naturalization by any means 
“contrary to law,” because a conviction under § 1425(a) results in 
automatic denaturalization under 8 U.S.C. § 1451(e).  Id. at 691.  The 
court noted that the 1st, 4th, 7th and 9th Circuits determined that 
§ 1425(a) implied a materiality requirement because § 1451(a) 
provided for a civil denaturalization and required materiality.  Id. at 
689.  The court disagreed with that decision as neither § 1425(a), nor 
§ 1451(e), use the term “material” when establishing the elements of 
conduct criminalized.  Id. at 690.  The court stated that to imply 
materiality as an element of § 1425(a) or § 1451(e) was to “ignore the 
plain text of [the statute] and disregard the overall statutory scheme 
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Congress has enacted for denaturalization . . . .”  Id. at 691 (alteration 
in original).  The 6th Circuit was persuaded rather by the construction 
of the statute itself and the inclusion of a civil action for 
denaturalization, which required materiality.  Id.  The court noted that 
the explicit inclusion of materiality in § 1451(a), and not in § 1425(a), 
reflected Congress’s intent that there be no materiality requirement 
included in § 1425(a).  Id. at 692.  Thus, the 6th Circuit concluded that 
there is no implied materiality required for a conviction under 
§ 1425(a).  Id. at 682. 
Immigration and Nationality Act – Sexual Abuse of a Minor: 
Rangel-Perez v. Lynch, 816 F.3d 591 (10th Cir. 2016) 
The 10th Circuit addressed whether 18 U.S.C. § 3509 is the 
exclusive touchstone for defining all elements of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act’s (INA) generic “sexual abuse of a minor” offense.  Id. 
at 598.  The court noted that the 4th and 9th Circuits determined that 
18 U.S.C. § 3509 is not the exclusive touchstone, while the 2nd, 3rd 
and 7th Circuits found that 18 U.S.C. § 3509 is the exclusive 
touchstone.  Id. at 599–601.  The 10th Circuit joined the 4th and 9th 
Circuits in holding that 18 U.S.C. § 3509 should be used as a guide, 
rather than the exclusive touchstone, following the court’s decision in 
In re Pedro Rodriguez-Rodriguez, 1999 BIA LEXIS 51, 22 I. & N. Dec. 
991 (B.I.A. 1999).  Thus, the 10th Circuit concluded that the statute is 
not the exclusive touchstone for defining all elements of the INA’s 
generic “sexual abuse of a minor” offense.  Rangel-Perez, 816 F.3d at 
601. 
Statutory Interpretation – Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA): Santos-Quiroa v. 
Lynch, 816 F.3d 160 (1st Cir. 2016) 
The 1st Circuit addressed the issue of whether the Illegal 
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act’s (IIRIRA) 
“stop-time” rule applied retroactively to an Order to Show Cause 
(OSC), thereby rendering a noncitizen ineligible for a suspension of 
deportation.  Id. at 161–63.  The 9th Circuit held that that if the Board 
of Immigration Appeals denied the noncitizen’s petition to reopen the 
deportation proceedings, that was considered a “final administrative 
decision,” and therefore, the “stop-time” rule did not apply.  Id. at 171.  
The court declined to follow the 9th Circuit’s approach, and instead 
held that the Board of Immigration Appeals’ interpretation and 
application of the “stop-time” rule to petitioner’s case was “reasonable 
and consistent with the statutory language.”  Id. at 170.  The Board of 
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Immigration Appeals’ interpretation was that “whether deportation 
proceedings were pending or final on April 1, 1997” was irrelevant to 
his eligibility for suspension of deportation.  Id. at 166.  The court 
further held that the plain statutory language of the IIRIRA 
demonstrated that “Congress intended the “stop-time” rule to apply to 
all OCSs, regardless of whether they were issued on, before, or after 
April 1, 1997.”  Id. at 170. 
 
